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Germans are opening up to the topic of immigration: According to 
the representative data of this report, less and less Germans without 
a migration background feel threatened by immigration. Also, their 
attitude towards naturalization has changed. The question “What is 
the decisive factor for granting German nationality?” is now answe-
red differently than in the 1990s. A significant part of the populati-
on without migration background considers ethnic German descent 
as less important. More and more Germans, however, believe that 
individual behavior should be the decisive factor for naturalization. 
In contrast, this doesn’t necessarily imply a decline of xenophobia: 
Persons placing high importance on behavior and cultural adapta-
tion have equally frequent xenophobic tendencies as persons consi-
dering ethnicity to be more important. Still, the number of Germans 
feeling strong hostility towards strangers went down at large.
The fear of immigration is the first indicator for the 
openness of a society towards migrants. If a high num-
ber of persons without migration background1 is strongly 
concerned about the phenomenon of immigration, social 
closure is at a high level. Data collected by the Socio-Eco-
nomic Panel (SOEP)2, which is connected to DIW Ber-
lin and sponsored by the Leibniz-Gemeinschaft (WGL), 
allow a longitudinal analysis (see box). In 1999, about 
a third of all German citizens without migration back-
ground was strongly concerned about immigration; ten 
years later, this figure has gone down to a quarter (Fi-
gure 1). In contrast, the percentage of persons who are 
not concerned about immigration has increased from 
16 to 32 percent between 1999 and 2009.
This tendency of decreasing concern can be observed 
in all analyzed groups—the only exception is the group 
of unemployed persons (Figure 2). The strongest dec-
line can be found in the group of senior citizens. This 
can probably be attributed to cohort effects: A growing 
number of individuals in the old generation has grown 
up after the war and shows less xenophobic attitudes.3 
All in all, the figure shows that people are less concer-
ned about immigration the higher they rank in their 
professional hierarchy. Persons whose jobs strongly de-
pend on economic ups and downs—such as manual 
labor or non-manual routine jobs4—worry most about 
immigration of potential workforce. This finding can 
partly be explained by the fact that a low level of educa-
1   We define persons without migration background as persons of German 
nationality who have not immigrated themselves and whose parents have not 
immigrated either.
2   Wagner, G.G. et al. (2008): Das Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP): 
multidisziplinäres Haushaltspanel und Kohortenstudie für Deutschland—Eine 
Einführung (für neue Datennutzer) mit einem Ausblick (für erfahrene 
Anwender). AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, 2(4), 
301-328.
3   See Rippl, S. (2008): Zu Gast bei Freunden? Fremdenfeindliche 
Einstellungen und interethnische Freundschaften im Zeitverlauf. In: F. Kalter 
(Hrsg.): Migration und Integration. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 48, 488-512.
4   Non-manual routine jobs are professions like clerks or cleaning staff.
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tion generally implies more skeptical attitudes towards 
immigration.5
On the whole, the level of concern was significantly lo-
wer in 2009 than in 1999. However, there were strong 
fluctuations within this ten-year period: Between 2001 
and 2005, a considerable increase of concern was obser-
ved in all professional groups. This might go back to the 
rise of international terrorism and the discussions on 
5   See Coenders, M. and Scheepers, P. (2003): The Effect of Education on Na-
tionalism and Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison. Political 
Psychology, 24(2), 313-343.
the integration of Muslims as well as political debates 
on migration: In 2001, the so-called immigration com-
mission6 published their report, which intensified the 
public discussion of the need for immigration to Ger-
many and the necessity of integration.7 From 2006 on-
wards—one year after the Immigration Act came into 
6   See Bundesministerium des Inneren (Hrsg.) (2001): Zuwanderung 
gestalten. Integration fördern. Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission 
„Zuwanderung“, Berlin.
7   In this regard see also the report of the so-called immigration council: 
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2004) (Hrsg.): Migration und 
Integration. Erfahrungen nutzen, Neues wagen. Jahresgutachten des 
Sachverständigenrates für Zuwanderung und Integration. Nürnberg
The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a representative survey 
of private households which is carried out annually by TNS 
Infratest Sozialforschung on behalf of DIW Berlin as part of 
the German research infrastructure. The survey was begun 
in 1984 in West Germany and since 1990 also includes East 
Germany. The SOEP collects data on socio-structural indicators 
as well as attitudes and concerns of respondents regarding 
specific topics and areas of life. In 2009, more than 20,000 
persons above the age of 16, representing more than 10,000 
households, took part in the survey.
Another survey belonging to the research infrastructure is 
the Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaf-
ten (ALLBUS). It is conducted biannually on behalf of GESIS 
(Mannheim) and collects data on behavior and attitudes of the 
German population, with a specific focus for each survey. In 
1996 and 2006, respondents were asked about their attitude 
towards foreigners and the importance of certain criteria 
for granting German nationality. This allows for example an 
analysis of a link between attitudes and changes over time. 
In this article, xenophobic attitudes are measured based on 
the following set of questions:
Foreigners living in Germany are a burden for the welfare  1. 
system.
Foreigners living in Germany enrich the cultural life in  2. 
Germany.
Foreigners living in Germany and their presence here  3. 
cause problems on the housing market.
Foreigners living in Germany take away jobs from Ger- 4. 
mans.
Foreigners living in Germany commit crimes more often  5. 
than Germans.
Answers were given on a scale from 1 to 7. For the calculation 
of the level of xenophobia, these answers were transformed 
into values from 0 to 6. Answers to the second question were 
rescaled to values from 6 to 0. Respondents with extreme 
values between 25 and 30 are considered as strongly xeno-
phobic and receive the value 1. Others receive the value 0. This 
dichotomous indicator is then used as explaining variable. 
The set of questions testing the attitudes towards natura-
lization was introduced with the following explanation: “I 
am going to list certain aspects which can play a role in the 
decision on granting German nationality. Please tell me with 
the help of the scale how important these aspects should be 
in this decision:
Whether the person was born in Germany, 1. 
is of German descent, 2. 
masters the German language, 3. 
has been living here for a long time, 4. 
is willing to adapt to German lifestyle, 5. 
is a member of a Christian church, 6. 
has not committed any crimes, 7. 
is able to earn their living.” 8. 
 
These criteria underwent a so-called factor analysis. This 
way, two dimensions of belonging became clear: an ethnic 
dimension (questions 1, 2, and 4) and a civil-cultural dimension 
(questions 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8). From these dimensions based 
on the respective questions, four types were created: strong 
agreement in both dimensions, weak agreement in both di-
mensions, agreement predominantly in the ethnic dimension 
and agreement predominantly in the civil-cultural dimension. 
Strong agreement is considered as values of at least 5 on the 
scale from 0 to 6.
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force—the percentage of Germans who were strongly 
concerned about immigration went down. Even if it re-
mains unclear which role the changed political treat-
ment of this topic has really played: It is striking that 
nearly 40 percent of Germans are satisfied with their 
government regarding immigration and integration. 
This is a high value, both in comparison with general 
satisfaction with the government and in international 
comparison.8
less and less persons show strongly 
xenophobic attitudes
The ALLBUS (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der So-
zialwissenschaften) dataset analyzed for 1996 and 2006 
shows9 that the average level of xenophobia in both East 
and West Germany has somewhat decreased (see tab-
le). The share of German respondents10 with a strongly 
xenophobic attitude declined quite significantly: From 
nine to four percent in West Germany and from 15 to 
four percent in East Germany.11 Obviously, there was a 
convergence of attitudes between West and East Ger-
many on a generally lower level. It is especially striking 
that in 2006, less respondents stated that foreigners li-
ving in Germany were taking away jobs from Germans 
or causing problems on the housing market.
Earlier studies have shown a correlation between the de-
gree of xenophobia and the legal or collective definiti-
on of national identity.12 The concept of national identi-
ty has changed over the past years. The reform of natio-
nality law may have contributed to this trend.
The new law, which came into force on January 1, 2000, 
introduced the birthplace principle, which was already 
8   Own calculations based on data by Transatlantic Trends on Immigration, 
www.trends.gmfus.org.
9   This Weekly Report is mainly based on an already published contribution 
of the authors: see Diehl, C. and Tucci, I. (2010): Ethnische Grenzziehung in 
Ost- und Westdeutschland: Konvergenz und Kulturalisierung. In: Krause, P. und 
Ostner, I. (Hrsg.): Leben in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Eine sozialwissenschaft-
liche Bilanz der deutschen Einheit 1990-2010, 557-572.
10   This evaluation includes only respondents who stated they were German 
by birth.
11   It should be noted that ALLBUS provides an old and a new set of 
questions for measuring xenophobic attitudes (for more information see Alba, 
R. and Johnson, M. (2000): Zur Messung aktueller Einstellungsmuster 
gegenüber Ausländern in Deutschland. In: Alba, R., Schmidt, P. und Wasmer, M. 
(Hrsg.): Deutsche und Ausländer: Freunde, Fremde oder Feinde? 229-253. If 
xenophobia is measured with the old foreigner items, a decline of strongly 
xenophobic attitudes can also be observed, while the average level remains 
quite stable (see also Diehl and Tucci (2010), l.c.).
12   Regarding the correlation between the concept of nation and xenophobia 
see Hjerm, M. (1998): National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A 
Comparison of Four Western Countries. Acta Sociologica, 41(4), 335-347 and 
Lewin-Epstein, N. and Levanon, A. (2005): National Identity and Xenophobia in 
an Ethnically Divided Society. International Journal on Multicultural Societies 
7(2), 90-118.
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1  Persons without migration background.
Source: SOEP.
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Though a peak occurred in 2005, concern about immigration is 
generally on the decline. 
Figure 2
Persons strongly concerned about Immigration, 




















1  Persons without migration background.
Source: SOEP.
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a possible right to German nationality were changed: 
The necessary length of stay for immigrants was redu-
ced from 15 to eight years. From 2006 onwards, other 
criteria like sound knowledge of the German language 
and passing of a citizenship test were discussed. These 
were finally introduced when nationality law was chan-
ged again in August 2007.
criteria for nationalization: Growing 
importance of cultural adaptation
Just like the legal framework has changed, the opini-
ons of German-born citizens on the necessary precon-
ditions for naturalization have undergone transforma-
tion too. The question “Who can become German?” is 
now answered differently than before.
When looking at the average values of the indicators for 
more or less important preconditions for naturalizati-
on, it becomes clear that criteria like knowledge of the 
language and adaptation to German lifestyle are now 
(2006) regarded as more important than in 1996 count-
rywide. In contrast, the precondition of German descent 
has lost some importance.
In terms of the indicators for the assessment of natura-
lization criteria, two dimensions can be distinguished: 
The first dimension comprises the criteria birth in Ger-
many, German descent and long duration of stay and is 
usually14 called ethnic dimension. The second dimensi-
on comprises indicators relating to behavior, including 
the need for civil and cultural adaptation (knowledge of 
the language, willingness to adapt to a “German life-
style”, membership of a Christian church, impunity, 
economic independence). 
Whereas 12 percent of Germans in West Germany and 
17 percent in East Germany strongly agreed with eth-
nic criteria of national identity in 1996, this figure went 
down to four and three percent respectively ten years la-
ter (Figure 3). The percentage of those considering both 
ethnic and civil-cultural criteria as equally important de-
clined in both parts of Germany too. However, the per-
centage of persons placing high value on civil-cultural 
preconditions has sharply increased: In 2006, 57 per-
cent of respondents in West Germany and 54 percent 
in East Germany considered criteria linked to behavior 
to be especially important. A separate look at specific 
indicators tells us that this increase was highest for the 
cultural preconditions of language skills15 and lifestyle 
adaptation, although a slight increase could also be ob-
14   Lewin-Epstein, N. and Levanon, A. (2005), l.c.
15   Language skills can be considered as civil and/or cultural precondition 
for naturalization.
common in other European countries like France. Befo-
re 2000, children of migrants did not automatically re-
ceive German nationality when they were born in Ger-
many. Since 2000, children of migrants receive Ger-
man nationality upon their birth in Germany if at least 
one parent has been living here for eight years and pos-
sesses an unlimited residence permit. In some cases, 
children of migrants can keep both their German na-
tionality and that of their parents.13 In other cases, they 
must choose one within five years after reaching matu-
rity. Although the principle of preventing multiple na-
tionality is kept with a number of exceptions, the int-
roduction of the birthplace principle shows a deviation 
from Germany’s traditional self-understanding as na-
tion by descent. Additionally, other preconditions for 
13   EU citizens and children with one German and one foreign parent are 
allowed to keep both nationalities.
Table 
attitudes toward Preconditions for naturalization and 
Xenophobia in 1996 and 2006
Scale from 1 to 7
1996 1996 2006 2006
West East West East
Germany Germany
Indicators for xenophobia
Foreigners living in Germany...
... are a burden for the welfare system1 4.0 4.6 4.0 4.7
... enrich the cultural life in Germany1,2 3.9 3.7 4.1 3.9
... cause problems on the housing market 4.3 4.0 2.7 2.1
... take away jobs from Germans 3.6 4.7 3.3 3.9
... commit crimes more often than Germans1,2 3.9 4.5 4.2 4.3
Total xenophobia (Scale from 0 to 30)3 14.8 17.3 13.1 14.2
Percentage of strongly xenophobic attitudes 9.4 15.3 3.7 4.1
Preconditions for Naturalization
Born in Germany2 4.7 5.0 3.5 3.6
German descent2 4.4 4.7 3.3 3.5
Master the German language2 5.4 4.5 6.3 6.2
Living here for a long time1,2 5.5 5.2 5.0 5.1
Willingness to adapt German lifestyle 5.0 4.8 5.6 5.9
Member of Christian church1 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.0
No crimes committed2 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.5
Earn their living2,4 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.0
 
1  Changes between 1996 and 2006 in East Germany are not statistically relevant.
2  Differences between East and West Germany in 2006 are not statistically relevant.
3  Rescaled to 0 – 6. The values of the second indicator are inverted.
4  Differences between East and West Germany in 1996 are not statistically relevant.
Source: ALLBUS 1996 and 2006.
© DIW Berlin 2011
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Furthermore, Germans preferring ethnic criteria are not 
significantly more xenophobic than advocates of purely 
civil-cultural criteria for naturalization.
conclusions
Our findings show considerable dynamics in attitudes 
towards immigration and immigrants since the middle 
of the 1990s. Still, immigration has become an integral 
part of German economy: In 2009, nearly 80 percent 
of Germans affirmed the question whether Germany 
was an immigration country. The heated media deba-
te on Thilo Sarrazin’s book “Deutschland schafft sich 
ab” (“Germany Does Away With Itself”) hasn’t changed 
much in this respect either.18 Although ethnic diversi-
ty seems to be part of German reality by now, demands 
for civil and cultural adaptation have sharply increased 
over the past decade; this is a development not easy to 
judge in its implications. It remains unclear whether 
lifestyle adaptation means sufficient language skills and 
respect for constitutional values such as equal rights for 
men and women, or if cultural assimilation goes bey-
ond that. Even if this question cannot be fully answe-
18   This is backed by our own calculations based on data of Transatlantic 
Trends on Immigration, www.trends.gmfus.org, before and several weeks after 
Sarrazin’s book was published.
served for the precondition of church membership, at 
least in West Germany, between 1996 and 2006. As a 
result of this development, the share of respondents not 
mentioning any specific preconditions for naturalizati-
on has gone down over time.
On the one hand, this clear shift points to a move away 
from ethnic criteria and to a more open concept of na-
tion. On the other hand—and this finding is harder to 
evaluate—the more frequent demand for lifestyle adap-
tation shows a stronger culture-related perception of the 
boundary between so-called “natives” and “foreigners”. 
A possible explanation might be the demand for respect 
for universal achievements such as gender equality. If 
this were the case, the advocates of civil-cultural criteria 
for naturalization should be less frequently xenophobic 
than those arguing for ethnic criteria. If, however, the 
demand for cultural adaptation or an adaptation to Ger-
man lifestyle were only a new and maybe socially more 
acceptable form of ethnic exclusion, their representa-
tives should be equally often xenophobic as those sup-
porting descent-based naturalization criteria.
cultural advocates are no less xenophobic
In the usual approaches to explain xenophobic attitudes, 
a number of determining factors are taken into account: 
structural or socio-demographic aspects (age, sex, level 
of education, employment, household income), social 
contacts (contact to foreigners), values and political con-
victions, anomy16 and concerns. These factors are addi-
tionally included in the present multivariate analysis17 
for the understanding of the concept of national belon-
ging. The results of this analysis (Figure 4) show us to 
what extent the percentage of strongly xenophobic per-
sons increases in relation to their concept of national 
identity. To this end, respondents placing high impor-
tance on civil-cultural and/or ethnic criteria for natu-
ralization are compared with persons who only mildly 
agree with both types of preconditions.
On average, eight percent of persons without migration 
background showed strongly xenophobic tendencies in 
1996 and 2006. This percentage increases by four per-
cent for persons considering both ethnic and civil-cultu-
ral naturalization criteria as very important. But also for 
respondents considering especially civil-cultural precon-
ditions as important, the share of persons with strongly 
xenophobic tendencies increases by two percent.
16   Anomy means a state of weakened social norms and rules causing the 
individual to feel a lack of orientation and emotional bonds.
17   The results for each factor are described in detail in Diehl and Tucci 
(2010), l.c.
Figure 3
attitudes toward Preconditions for 
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Great importance of all criteria
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Source: ALLBUS 1996 and 2006.
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red, our analysis shows a changed concept of national 
identity. However, the overall decline of xenophobic at-
titudes is not due to this changed understanding of na-
tional identity: Other than expected, advocates of civil-
cultural conditions for naturalization are just as likely 
to have xenophobic tendencies as those defending tra-
ditional ethnic criteria.
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Figure 4
Percentage of Respondents with strongly Xenophobic attitude 
Deviation from overall average in percentage points 
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Persons placing high importance on all criteria for naturalization are generally  
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